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Abstract
This paper studies the mechanisms, implications, and potential applications of the re-
cently discovered class of Zero Determinant (ZD) strategies in iterated 2x2 games. These
strategies were reported to successfully extort pure economic maximizers, and to mis-
chievously determine the set of feasible long-term payoffs in iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma
by enforcing linear constraints on both players’ expected average scores.
These results are generalized for all symmetric 2x2 games and a general Battle of the
Sexes, exemplified by four common games. Additionally, a comparison to conventional
strategies is made and typical ZD gameplay simulations are analyzed along with con-
vergence speeds. Several response strategies are discussed, including a glance on how
time preferences change previous results. Furthermore, a possibility of retaliation is
presented: when maximin scores exceed the minimum symmetric payoff, it is possible
to extort the extortioner.
Finally, a summary of findings from evolutionary game theory shows that mischief is
limited by its own malice. Nevertheless, this does not challenge the result that mindless
economic maximization is subject to extortion: the study of ZD strategies reveals excit-
ing new perspectives and opportunities in game theory, both evolutionary and classic.
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1. Introduction
In many branches of the social sciences, game theory has been used to model, predict, and
understand interaction of a number of agents subjected to the same rules: games can be
anything from auctions to competition, from political elections to social contracts, and
from judiciary to matrimonial trouble. Perhaps the simplest useful class of games are 2x2
games: interactions between two players, each choosing one of two actions. Despite their
simple appearance, many phenomena of game theory can already be observed in this
basic form: “the players act rationally, but the consequences are often bizarre, which
makes application to a world of intelligent men and ludicrous outcomes appropriate”
[Rasmusen, p. 2].
The contrast between the same 2x2 games when they are played once and when they
are played in series, both in simplicity of solution concepts and in their strategic impli-
cations, led to a wide range of social phenomena being rationalized: the same egoistic
players who exhibit rational yet (bizarrely) anti-social behavior in once-off encounters
can be driven to more cooperative actions in iterated games. Consequently, the theory
of 2x2 games has often been used as a study of social cooperation [Axelrod-a].
In a recent paper by William Press and Freeman Dyson [Press/Dyson], the class of
Zero Determinant (ZD) strategies for iterated 2x2 games was discovered, promising to
beat rationalistic agents on their own ground: mindful players can exploit pure economic
rationality by extorting a larger payoff share for themselves. The aim of this present
paper is to study those strategies, which were believed to threaten the more cooperative
nuances in game theory. How, and under what conditions do ZD strategies work? Can
they indeed outperform the intuitive and conventional behavior of tit for tat, as has
been claimed? How can we gain from this new and mischievous knowledge? And how
can the less mischievous protect themselves?
This chapter provides a minimal context to understand the foundations ZD strate-
gies stand on. All analysis in this paper strives to be as general as possible; however,
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to facilitate demonstration and to provide meaningful examples, the first section will
introduce four of the most common 2x2 games, noting some of their applications. When
such stage games are iterated, their dynamic changes substantially: the following sec-
tions thus introduce the theory of iterated 2x2 games, and one of its landmarks, the
Folk theorem. Having seen that predictions about iterated games are less clear-cut than
their once-off pendants, a short summary of simulated tournaments between different
strategies in iterated games will complete this chapter.
In chapter 2, I analyze the mechanisms and implications of ZD strategies. After a
thorough recapitulation of their derivation, they be will generalized for more general
games and their behavior will be studied both analytically and numerically. Finally,
I will provide a number of response options and try to integrate Zero Determinant
strategies with classic game theory.
In chapter 3 these results are utilized for a brief digression to evolutionary game
theory, discussing potential applications of ZD strategies as well as their chances of
success.
Finally, a short commentary will conclude this paper. In the appendices, I provide
technical details for my results.
1.1. Exemplary 2x2 stage games
Four of the most commonly studied 2x2 games will serve as examples in this paper: the
Prisoners’ Dilemma, Stag Hunt, the Game of Chicken, and the Battle of the Sexes. The
first three of those are symmetric games, which means that they can all be represented
in a symmetric payoff matrix (see table 1.1): this reflects the fact that players have
the same preferences over game outcomes, as defined by their own and their opponent’s
move.
up down
up R, R S, T
down T, S P, P
Table 1.1.: A symmetric 2x2 game payoff matrix
In any 2x2 stage game, two players face a once-off decision between two possible
actions: in this example they are generically named “up” and “down”. One player, X,
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chooses an action on the table’s rows (hence she is called row-player), while the other, Y ,
chooses an action on the table’s columns (hence he is called column-player). If the row-
player chooses her action aX = down and the column-player chooses his action aY = up,
for instance, the outcome of the game shall be referred to as (aX , aY ) = (down, up).
Payoffs for player i ∈ {X, Y } are formally defined as a function giving a score for each
possible outcome: pii : (aX , aY )→ R. In the example of the symmetric game, payoffs for
(down, up) are then (piX(down, up), piY (down, up)) = (T, S): the cells in 1.1 show payoffs
(piX , piY ) for each of the possible game outcomes. Players are assumed to have strongly
monotone preferences over payoffs, implying T > S ⇔ T  S where “” is the strong
preference relation.
I assume quantitative symmetry in this paper, meaning that symmetry not only holds
for ordinal relations between payoffs but rather for the exact payoff values. That is,
piX(aX , aY ) = piY (aY , aX). Here, this allows for easier notation without loss of analytic
generality.
Finally, for completeness, we loosely define:1 a strategy σi of player i is a “plan to
choose an action ai”. The payoff function can then be defined over strategies instead of
actions: pii : (σX , σY ) → R. A Nash equilibrium is a combination of strategies for both
players where, given the strategy of the other player, no player would want to change
his strategy. A maximin strategy is a strategy for player i yielding his maximin payoff
r := ri = maxσi minσ−i pii(σX , σY ) (where −i signifies player i’s opponent): the highest
payoff player i can guarantee himself regardless of his opponent’s action.2 In this paper,
maximin is always “pure strategy maximin,” i.e. restricted to strategies that explicitly
define an action ai. As for notation: v is a column vector, v
ᵀ is the transposed vector (a
row vector), vk is the k-th component of v, N is a matrix, p(A) is the probability of A,
p(A|B) is the conditional probability of A, conditioned on B, and E[A] is the expected
value of A.
1.1.1. Prisoners’ Dilemma
The Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) is probably the most widely studied game in game the-
ory; it is characterized by the relations T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S. In this
1For more detailed definitions, see e.g. [Gibbons].
2Since we analyze quantitatively symmetric games, both players have the same maximin payoff. To
simplify notation, I use r = rX = rY .
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paper, Axelrod’s canonical payoffs [Axelrod-a] will be used for numerical analyses, i.e.
(R, S, T, P )PD = (3, 0, 5, 1).
While its original story is built around a federal leniency program, PD is generally
treated as a game about cooperation: suppose two parties share a common good. Both
parties can choose to either respectfully use that good in moderation (cooperate, up),
allowing both parties to benefit from it. Or they can claim an unproportional share
(defect, down), which promises higher returns regardless of their opponent’s action. Due
to the individual incentive to defect, both parties find themselves in mutual defection,
resulting in the shared good being destroyed. The mechanism of individual incentives
favoring a collectively disappointing outcome can be applied to a wide range of phenom-
ena, from free riding to the tragedy of the commons, from the rule of law to pollution.
Because of its universal character and its intuitive simplicity, PD’s general structure
has become paradigmatic to the study of social cooperation: indeed, even contemporary
social philosophers continue to rely on its logic [Rawls, pp. 238ff.].
Because of the incentive to defect regardless of the opponent’s action, PD has a
single Nash equilibrium, (down, down), which is usually called “mutual defection.” The
resulting payoffs are also the maximin payoff: r = P .
1.1.2. Stag Hunt
Stag Hunt (SH) is another game often referred to in the context of cooperation. In SH,
the following relation holds: R > T ≥ P > S. To make the game more interesting for
illustrative purposes, I assume T = P . Then two Nash equilibria exist in pure strategies:
(up, up) and (down, down), where the former is payoff dominant (players receive higher
payoffs) and the latter is risk dominant (players do not risk being exploited, for they
receive the same payoff regardless of their opponent’s action). Obviously, the risk dom-
inant Nash equilibrium also gives the maximin payoffs, r = P . Additionally, a mixed
Nash equilibrium exists, where both players choose to play up with a certain probability.
When numerical analyses are required, I will use (R, S, T, P )SH = (10, 0, 8, 8). With
these payoffs, the mixed Nash equilibrium is for both players to choose p(up) = 0.8—the
players are then indifferent between both pure actions.
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1.1.3. Game of Chicken
The Game of Chicken (GC) has been used to study escalating behavior in conflicts
and has famously been applied to brinkmanship in nuclear warfare [Russell, pp. 30ff.].
In GC, payoffs are characterized by T > R > S ≥ P . For numerical values, I take
(R, S, T, P )GC = (6, 2, 7, 0).
In GC, both players “dare each other” to play down, but prefer any alternative to
(down, down) (the worst result where both players “escalate”). Thus two pure strategy
Nash equilibria exist, (up, down) and (down, up)—one player will always prefer to back
down. Additionally, a mixed Nash equilibrium exists (with payoffs as defined, both
players choose p(up) = 2/3). In GC, the maximin payoff is r = S, the minimum payoff
from backing down.
1.1.4. Battle of the Sexes
As the most common example of asymmetric games, this paper further studies the Battle
of the Sexes (BS): here the players have different preferences about the game’s outcome,
yielding a different payoff matrix (see table 1.2). Payoff values satisfy F > D > C ≥ L,
and I will assume (F,C, L,D)BS = (5, 1, 1, 3) for numerical analyses.
up down
up F, D C, C
down L, L D, F
Table 1.2.: Payoffs in the Battle of the Sexes
The dilemma of a couple who cannot agree on a way to spend the evening3 epito-
mizes coordination issues between two parties: imagine negotiations over contractual
conditions: both parties want the contract to be signed, but both hope to establish their
preferred alternatives. Pure strategy Nash equilibria thus are (up, up) and (down, down)
(successful coordination), and a mixed Nash equilibrium exists (with payoffs as defined,
both players choose p(up) = 1/3). The maximin payoff is r = C, i.e. failing to coordinate
but having claimed the preferred alternative.
3“While selfish, they are deeply in love and would, if necessary, sacrifice their [favorite alternative] to
be with each other. Less romantically, their payoffs are [...]” [Rasmusen, p. 28]
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1.2. Iterated games
Many applications of 2x2 stage games are better described when the assumption of once-
off encounters is dropped: instead, two players repeatedly play the same game against
each other, each time receiving a stage game payoff.
Suppose the Prisoners’ Dilemma is played repeatedly. Then PD(T ) signifies the iter-
ated game obtained by playing PD T -times. Let PDt signify the t-th period of PD(T ),
i.e. the t-th sequential stage game. Each stage game PDt is the same, except for a history
of game outcomes that were already played, and a different number of iterations, PDt′>t,
to follow. Both players know this, i.e. they know how many more “rounds” they will play,
and they recall a history of previous outcomes. Let Ht := ((aX , aY )1, . . . , (aX , aY )t) be
such a history of t outcomes, signified by the actions aX , aY ∈ {up, down} in PD1, ... ,t.
This shared knowledge allows both players to condition their action in PDt on the ob-
served history of previous outcomes: their strategies can be understood as functions of
history, σi(Ht).
If both players do not know exactly when the sequence of stage game iterations is going
to end (i.e. there is no clear-cut T , or the players don’t know its value), the iterated game
may be analyzed as an infinitely iterated game, PD(∞, δ), with a certain probability4
(1− δ) of ending in every period [Rasmusen, pp. 131ff.]. Under such circumstances, no
player can ever be certain that he is playing the last round of the iterated game. Aside
from the history of previous plays, every iteration thus presents the same stage game:
the probability of the game continuing is always the same. Analysis shows that the clear-
cut Nash equilibria of stage games are now complemented by a multitude of additional
equilibria: this will be demonstrated for the infinitely iterated PD (iPD—iSH, iGC, and
iBS conversely are the infinitely iterated counterparts of the stage games defined above)
before the more general Folk theorem is introduced in the next subsection.
The once-off PD game, where “mutual defection” is the only Nash equilibrium, is
the archetype of rational players and bizarre outcomes. By contrast, the “cooperative”
game outcome (up, up) can be stabilized as Nash equilibrium for every iteration of iPD
[Eichberger, pp. 216ff.]; consider player Y in one iteration of iPD. Knowing that he will
probably continue to play a sequence of games after this one, he will want not only to
4Without loss of generality, let this also cover players’ time preferences: no additional discount rate
is considered in this paper. In the following analyses, G(∞, δ) is to mean “infinitely repeated stage
game G with common discount rate δ.”
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myopically maximize his payoff in this iteration, but also to consider future payoffs. His
interest in future payoffs, to be precise, will depend on the discount factor δ, as he will
try to maximize the discounted payoff PY , where
Pi(σX , σY ) := lim inf
T→∞
T∑
t=1
δt−1pii(σX(Ht), σY (Ht)) (1.1)
The discount factor simply reduces the attention paid to payoffs from more distant (and
therefore less likely) iterations.
Now assume X to play the following grim trigger strategy: play up until Y plays down
for the first time. Then forever continue playing down. In every iteration Y can choose
to either receive T followed by an infinite series of P , or to receive an infinite series of
R. If Y cares enough about future payoffs (i.e. if δ is large enough), the future cost of
reverting to the stage game equilibrium will outweigh the present benefit of defecting,
and playing up in every iteration will maximize Y ’s overall score. Then if Y decides to
play the analogous grim trigger strategy (up until X first plays down), neither player has
an incentive to deviate from their strategies, yielding (up, up) in every iteration of iPD.
This result has been understood as key to social phenomena: even in situations
which normally discourage cooperation, such as the tragedy of the commons [Dawes] as
exemplified in iPD, cooperation becomes possible if two players do not know how long
they will interact with each other, and if they care enough about future interactions.
1.3. The Folk theorem
The Folk theorem generalizes the result that by iterating a stage game infinitely, more
Nash equilibria are obtained than in the stage game. To be precise, applied to 2x2
games, it states that in any infinitely iterated game G(∞, δ) there exist (subgame-
perfect [Eichberger, pp. 221f.]) Nash equilibria that yield average stage game payoffs of
(piX , piY ) if the following conditions hold [Gibbons, p. 97]:
1. The stage game G has a Nash equilibrium yielding payoffs (eX , eY ), and pii > ei
for both players i.
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2. The probability of the game continuing (the discount rate), δ, is sufficiently close
to 1. This ensures that threats about future behavior have a big enough impact
on present decision making.
Analogous to the PD example above, in any infinitely iterated game a credible threat
can be made to fall back to the Nash equilibrium yielding payoffs (eX , eY ) (piX , piY ),
a worse (but equilibrium) outcome for both players. A grim trigger strategy would thus
be along the lines of “play a combination of stage game actions yielding on average
(piX , piY ), until an opponent diverts from that combination. Then, continue playing the
stage game equilibrium strategy yielding (eX , eY ) forever after.”
This result adds a convex set of feasible Nash equilibria to the infinitely iterated
game: fig. 1.1 demonstrates this in the case of iPD. All strategy combinations yielding
payoffs in the blue area can be achieved as equilibrium payoffs in iPD when δ is large
enough. However, the Folk theorem merely states that all combinations in this set can
be achieved as equilibria; no statement is made about whether such equilibria will
indeed be reached.
1.4. Tournaments of strategy zoos
Infinitely iterated 2x2 games have been used to study a wide range of topics, from social
behavior (e.g. [Axelrod-a, pp. 73ff.]) to economic competition (e.g. [Rasmusen, pp.
136ff.]) and even questions of evolutionary biology (see e.g. [Weibull] for the diverse
literature). The Folk theorem gives some indication on why their relatively simple
mechanism (two players, each having only two possible actions) has sparked so much
interest: while it is clear that a whole set of payoffs can generally be achieved as Nash
equilibrium, it remains unclear which specific point from the set will ensue in a game and
which strategies are suited to obtain optimal payoffs when no information is available
about one’s opponent.
The question therefore is which strategies would be most successful if infinitely iter-
ated games were played “in the wild.” In diverse applications, formal analyses as well
as computer simulations are applied to find especially successful strategies, or to un-
derstand the dynamics of different populations of strategies (representing for example
cultural conventions, marketing strategies, or biological species).
In computer simulations, populations of players using different strategies are ran-
8
SP
R
T
S P R T
Prisoners’ DilemmapiY
piX
(up, up)
(up, down)
(down, down)*
(down, up)
Figure 1.1.: The Folk theorem: feasible Nash equilibria in iPD
Note: the set of possible payoffs is the convex hull of all stage game payoffs, the total gray and blue
area. The Folk theorem states that the area marked blue can be achieved as subgame-perfect Nash
equilibria in the infinitely iterated game by threatening to play the stage game Nash equilibrium (*).
domly pitted against each other to form a competitive, unpredictable environment. The
most famous of such tournaments, Axelrod’s first iPD tournament [Axelrod-a], showed
variations of the so called tit-for-tat strategy (TFT) to be particularly successful. The
original TFT strategy plays up in the first iteration and then plays whatever move its
opponent played last; much like the grim trigger strategy, TFT can successfully establish
cooperative payoffs.
In subsequent tournaments, both amateur [Prase] and scientific, this result was con-
firmed, consistently ranking more or less “cooperative” strategies similar to TFT or
win-stay-loose-shift [Nowak/Sigmund] among the top strategies in terms of total pay-
offs: while they can generally be exploited by an opponent primed to do so, they tend
to achieve relatively high payoffs both for themselves and for their opponents. This
makes them typical winners in tournaments of strategy zoos when it comes to total
payoffs earned, while “losing” most individual games against single opponents: while
9
more “fierce” strategies can outperform TFT by a small amount, they will receive much
smaller payoffs in the fierce battle between themselves, enabling TFT to win by total
payoff earned.
These results are confirmed in a wide range of literature (for an overview, see [Axelrod-b,
Hoffmann]), and for strategies like TFT it has been established that they can only be
beaten by an infinitesimal amount, effectively equalizing their own and their opponent’s
score.
10
2. Zero Determinant Strategies
The well-established success of such intuitive patterns as tit-for-tat and the “fairness”
they induce contributed to the considerable attention received by a paper recently pub-
lished by William Press and Freeman Dyson [Press/Dyson]:5 they report the discovery
of a class of “simple ultimatum [strategies] whereby one player can enforce a unilateral
claim to an unfair share of rewards” [Press/Dyson, p. 1] in iPD. The properties of their
Zero Determinant (ZD) strategies are this paper’s main interest.
In sections 2.1 and 2.2, we follow Press and Dyson’s derivation of ZD strategies, ex-
panding on critical points and introducing the notation used in this chapter. Section 2.3
interprets Press and Dyson’s main results, which are generalized and illustrated in sec-
tion 2.4. There, concrete strategies are shown for the four games analyzed here, along
with results from exemplary gameplay simulations.
The implications for a ZD player’s opponent are discussed in section 2.6, where I
present conditions for a simple yet effective response to ZD strategies. To assess the
aptitude of ZD strategies in real-world applications, section 2.5 analyzes convergence
speed. Finally section 2.7 attempts to integrate ZD strategies with classical game theo-
retic approaches.
2.1. Generality of memory-1 analysis
In section 1.2 it was assumed that players in an iterated game know the whole history of
plays; however, especially in infinitely iterated games, it appears sensible to assume that
players condition their strategy only on a finite subset of recent history—if this is the
case, competing players might use different memory spans: one player who remembers
and uses the last 20 outcomes may compete against a particularly forgetful player who
5Besides a number of scientific responses published so far, the paper was notably covered in popular
media, despite its technicality [Droesser, Bartlett, TechnologyReview].
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can only recall the very last move, and thus only conditions his strategy on the very
last outcome. The strategy that is conditional on the last 20 moves will be called a
memory-20 strategy; the latter players’ strategy is a memory-1 strategy. Note that even
a player with long memory might play a memory-1 strategy, i.e. she might condition
her moves on the last outcome only.
ZD strategies are a subclass of memory-1 strategies, i.e. they are conditional only
on the last stage game’s outcome. Since in their analysis Press and Dyson pit them
against a general memory-1 strategy, they have to show that this is sufficiently general
to cover all possible opponents, including those who have longer memory. They do
this by showing—somewhat counterintuitively—that the “shortest memory-player sets
the rules of the game” [Press/Dyson, p. 4]: playing any memory-n strategy would not
yield any advantages over playing another memory-1 strategy against ZD strategies.
This refutes the obvious argument against their analysis, viz. that it fails to cover more
intricate opponents.
Any memory in excess of the shared memory of both players is irrelevant. This is
due to the simple fact that a memory-1 strategy player cannot apprehend reactions
conditioned on a history she forgot already. Thus, to her, even the most intricate
strategy will appear to be a memory-1 strategy: the one obtained by averaging over all
outcomes remembered by her opponent but not by her. If her opponent were to play this
averaged-over strategy, she would not notice any difference to the memory-n strategy.
Since her strategy will thus not be affected by averaging, the relevant gameplay would
be equivalent: the distribution over the number of stage game outcomes,
∑
g∈S
∞∑
Cg=0
p(Cg) = 1 (2.1)
where Cg is the number of stage game outcomes g ∈ S (such as (up, down), see below)
in the infinitely iterated game, will be exactly the same.
Press and Dyson present an analytical proof [Press/Dyson, appx 1]; this somewhat
counter-intuitive result can further be made plausible by two arguments. Firstly, memory
enables strategy patterns, such as “play down if the opponent played down twice in a
row.” If, however, one player’s strategy pattern is a sequence longer than his opponent’s
memory, the pattern length in excess of his opponent’s memory will never be noticed by
his opponent, and will thus never influence his actions. Secondly, an intuitive objection
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is that the longer-memory opponent will not know the outcomes to average over before
the game begins. While this is true, it is besides the point: after the game, we know that
a shorter-memory strategy existed that would have yielded the same gameplay—during
the game, the players just did not necessarily know which one.
Thus, if a memory-1 strategy is analyzed against another memory-1 strategy, all possi-
ble game outcomes will be considered: all possible strategies that could ever play against
a ZD strategy ex post have a corresponding memory-1 strategy that yields the same pay-
offs. Therefore, Press and Dyson’s analysis of iPD as a game between two memory-1
strategies is sufficiently general to cover all possible outcomes in iPD: opponents with
longer memory cannot “outplay” ZD strategies.
2.2. Infinitely iterated games as Markov processes
Having established the generality of memory-1 analysis, this section follows Press and
Dyson in their derivation of ZD strategies, expanding on theoretical background. Along
with Press and Dyson, we can without loss of generality describe any infinitely iterated
2x2 game with at least one ZD strategy player by the following:6
Two memory-1 players, X and Y .
Both players’ action sets and the resulting set of possible stage game outcomes
as described by (aX , aY ) ≡ xy ∈ (uu, ud, du, dd) =: S, where we have defined
ud := (up, down), and uu, du, dd analogously for notational convenience.
Each player’s strategy, which is defined as a vector of conditional probabilities of
playing up, conditioned on the last stage game outcome (the “content” of each
player’s memory-1). Since both players decide between up and down only, the
probability of playing down is given by p(ai = down|xy) = 1− p(ai = up|xy).
X’s strategy is p = (p1, p2, p3, p4)
ᵀ where the order of probabilities corresponds to
the last game outcome, xy ∈ (uu, ud, du, dd) (i.e. p2 := P (aX = up|xy = ud)).
Likewise, Y ’s strategy is q = (q1, q2, q3, q4)
ᵀ where the probabilities correspond to
the last game outcome, seen from his perspective, yx ∈ (uu, ud, du, dd). Thus,
q2 := P (aY = up|xy = du). Then the simplest strategies are the unconditional
6For a mathematically more rigorous account of the derivation of ZD strategies, see [Akin].
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up-player, AllU with p = (1, 1, 1, 1)ᵀ, and the unconditional down-player, AllD with
p = (0, 0, 0, 0)ᵀ
Technically, to be complete, both strategies need a fifth, unconditional probability
of playing up in the first move (when no history is known to condition the move
on). However, since the game is infinitely long, the first move is of neglectable
relevance for Press and Dyson’s analysis [Hilbe/Nowak/Sigmund, Sigmund]. This
will especially hold true in the following analysis using Markov chain theory.
Payoff vectors for X and Y , in order of xy ∈ (uu, ud, du, dd). In the example of
symmetric games, sX = (R, S, T, P )
ᵀ and sY = (R, T, S, P )
ᵀ (see table 1.1).
A common discount factor for both players. To facilitate analysis, and in line
with Press and Dyson’s (implicit) practice, we assume δ = 1 for now. This allows
us to assume that both players seek to maximize their (expected) average payoff
over all iterations, which is easily comparable to simple stage game payoffs, since
an infinite series of stage games yielding payoffs R will have an average payoff
of exactly R. Maximizing average payoff is equivalent to maximizing total payoff
(which is given by eq. (1.1) for δ = 1) [Eichberger, pp. 210ff.].
Since the average payoffs are directly comparable to stage game payoffs, we will
later define pii to denote player i’s expected average payoffs, continuing the same
notation from chapter 1: from here on, only infinitely iterated games will be ana-
lyzed, and pii is simply taken to mean “expected average score over all, i.e. infinitely
many games to come.” The (strong) assumption of δ = 1 will be loosened later
(see section 2.6).
An infinitely iterated game thus defined is equivalent to a time-homogenous7 Markov-
chain over four possible states, S = (uu, ud, du, dd). This means that the sequence of
stage game outcomes can be analyzed as a stochastic process where the probability of
the next state depends only on the current state. If this game’s outcome was (ud), for
instance, the probability of the next game’s outcome being (du) is P (du|ud) = P (aX =
7This assumes that for each player an equivalent, fixed memory-1 strategy exists (i.e. there are
equivalent p,q that remain constant over all iterations). This can be shown to be true (cf. section 2.5)
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down|ud)∗P (aY = up|ud) ≡ (1−p2)q3. This yields the iterated game’s Markov transition
matrix:
M =

p1q1 p1(1− q1) (1− p1)q1 (1− p1)(1− q1)
p2q3 p2(1− q3) (1− p2)q3 (1− p2)(1− q3)
p3q2 p3(1− q2) (1− p3)q2 (1− p3)(1− q2)
p4q4 p4(1− q4) (1− p4)q4 (1− p4)(1− q4)
 (2.2)
The transition matrix gives the probability of being in a specific state at any point of
the Markov chain: let µ1 be a column vector giving the probability distribution over the
four states in the first iteration (which would be given by unconditional probabilities
for X and Y in the first stage game), i.e. µ1
ᵀ1 = 1 and e.g. µ12 = P (ud). Then
the probabilities of being in each of the states (uu, ud, du, dd) two iterations later, is
µ3
ᵀ = µ1
ᵀM2 with each µ3k giving the probability for the corresponding state xy ∈ S
[Kemeny, thm 2.3.2].
It can be shown8 that for general p and q and for any starting distribution µ1 , the
Markov process given by M will converge to the same probability distribution (the
stationary distribution) for later iterations. This stationary distribution is characterized
by piᵀM = piᵀ and piᵀ1 = 1 [Kemeny, thm 4.1.6] (⇔ piᵀ is a left eigenvector of M
with eigenvalue 1): this can be understood by recalling that the Markov chain is a
process that repeatedly visits a finite set of states (in our case, S). When such a process
is infinitely long, it is intuitive that the average number of visits for each state will
converge to a distribution over states that replicates itself. Mathematical analysis shows
this distribution to be unique.
Since our game is infinitely iterated, pi will give the expected distribution [Stroock,
pp. 26f.] over game outcomes: we know that in some future iteration, the distribution
over S will reach pi, and that from then on it will stay there forever, making it the
expected distribution for the total infinite chain. The law of large numbers for Markov
chains proves that as the game proceeds over an infinite number of stages, the average
of observed game outcomes will also converge to pi [Kemeny, Aˆ§4.2].
8For some values of p and q, M will not satisfy the conditions for regular Markov chains [Kemeny,
pp. 36ff.]. However, by calculating A4 := 1/4
∑3
m=0M
m it can be shown that the chain converges
nonetheless (cf. appendix B.1). This suffices to prove that the average time spent in any of the four
possible states will converge, and a unique stationary distribution will exist [Stroock, Aˆ§2.2.2].
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Since the average payoffs for X and Y depend only on this history of game outcomes,
the expected average payoff for both players will also converge in an infinitely iterated
game. Let s¯
(t)
i be the average score after t iterations for player i. Let further pi
(t)
i be
the expected value of s¯
(t)
i . Now, as t → ∞, the expected average payoffs converge to
pi
(∞)
i := E
[
s¯
(∞)
i
]
= piᵀsi , which is the expected average payoff of the infinitely iterated
game. Every stage t > 1 of the infinitely iterated game is exactly the same (one historic
move is common knowledge, the same stage game is played, and an infinite series of
the same game follows), and every sequence of future games is probabilistic in nature
(the strategies are probabilities): players who want to maximize their average stage
game payoff over all games to come (as assumed here) will be interested in this expected
average payoff pi
(∞)
i .
9 It is therefore convenient to define pii := pi
(∞)
i from here on (which
is directly comparable to stage game payoffs, as noted above).
Press and Dyson show that for any Markov matrix as given by M, the expected
average payoffs are given by
pii = pi
ᵀsi =
D(p,q, si)
D(p,q,1)
, where
D(p,q,f ) := det

p1q1 − 1 p1 − 1 q1 − 1 f1
p2q3 p2 − 1 q3 f2
p3q2 p3 q2 − 1 f3
p4q4 p4 q4 f4
 ≡ λ ∗ piᵀf (2.3)
(with λ ∈ R, and f ∈ R4. The denominator cancels out the scale factor λ). Then,
because D(p,q,f ) is a linear function in f , for any α, β, γ ∈ R
αpiX + βpiY + γ =
D(p,q, αsX + βsY + γ1)
D(p,q,1)
(2.4)
This is the core of ZD strategies: since by choice of their strategy X and Y both
independently control one column of the determinant in eq. (2.3), they can unilaterally
choose a strategy that makes their respective column linearly dependent on f . In this
9It is noted that using expected payoffs generally implies that players are risk-neutral, an assumption
made in order not to further complicate our analysis: a partial remedy may be to modify stage game
payoffs to reflect risk aversion.
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case the determinant in the numerator of eq. (2.4) is 0 (hence “zero determinant”
strategies):10 X can enforce the linear relationship αpiX+βpiY +γ = 0 to hold by choosing
her strategy such that it satisfies the following constraint where α, β, γ are chosen by
her freely such that p remains in the realm of probability vectors (i.e. for every element
k of the strategy 0 ≤ pk ≤ 1):
p = αsX + βsY + γ1 + (1, 1, 0, 0)
ᵀ (2.5)
All following analyses will take the illustrative viewpoint of X: Y has the exact same
options to play zero determinant strategies with (q1, q3, q2, q4)
ᵀ = αsX + βsY + γ1 +
(1, 0, 1, 0)ᵀ (where structural differences in the equation are due to the ordering of payoff
vectors).
2.3. Mischief and extortion
Equation (2.4) “allows much mischief” [Press/Dyson, p. 2]: by choosing values α, β, γ
that keep her strategy p as defined in eq. (2.5) in the realm of possibility vectors, X can
unilaterally impose certain constraints on the iterated game’s expected average scores:11
Firstly, X may choose to set α = 0, yielding piY = −γ/β. By doing so, she can
unilaterally determine Y ’s expected average payoff: Y ’s strategy will have no impact
whatsoever on his average payoffs in the long run, and he will thus be indifferent between
all his strategy options. However, X’s own payoff will then fully depend on Y , and will
often not be very high. Due to the (potentially) malicious character of such strategies,
this class of strategies will be called ZDmischief strategies in this paper. They have been
studied before (with a different proof and nomenclature) by [Boerlijst/Nowak/Sigmund].
The feasible payoffs to be set unilaterally depend on the payoff matrix; in the next
section I present feasible values for the games analyzed here. It can already be noted,
however, that it will be impossible to set scores which are less than the opponent’s
10Of course, this leaves pii undefined when p or q are (1, 1, 0, 0)
ᵀ (when the denominator is 0). In such
cases, the Markov chain may be analyzed on a reduced subset of S (see appendix B.1).
11Note that eq. (2.5) generally leaves one degree of freedom for all strategies discussed here: for all
parameters discussed, a multitude of ZD strategies exists.
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maximin payoff in any game: Y can always revert to his maximin strategy to escape the
mischief. Indeed, this lower bound is confirmed in my analytical derivation.
Secondly and most interestingly, X may enforce a linear relation between her and Y ’s
scores: X may ensure herself a multiple of every surplus Y earns over a certain offset.
By setting γ = −(α∆ +β∆), for any offset ∆, X enforces (piX −∆) = χ(piY −∆), where
χ := −β/α is the “extortion factor.” For values χ > 1 such strategies could be described
as enforcing an “unfair,”12 extortionate share of payoffs for X; this class of strategies
with α 6= 0 6= β will thus be called ZDextortion strategies in this paper.
Generally the range of feasible extortion factors will depend on the choice of ∆. In
the games analyzed here, there are ranges for ∆ in which there are upper bounds on the
extortion factor, and ranges for ∆ which do not limit extortion.
Natural values for ∆ are maximin payoffs r: by setting ∆ = r, X ensures that she
will get χ-times any surplus Y earns on his maximin payoff. Since Y cannot by himself
earn more than r, it should be possible to extort any unequal share of payoffs above
maximin (the extortion argument going somewhat like this: “if you want to earn more
than you could by yourself, you have to pay me a larger share for my cooperation”).
Indeed, in all games analyzed here, maximin payoffs are a lower bound for ∆ if there is
to be no upper bound on χ (see the next section).
In some games it might further be tempting to set a smaller offset, e.g. ∆ = 0 to
achieve piX = χpiY . Often, this does not yield feasible strategies. When it does, however,
there will typically be an upper bound on the extortion factor. The next section discusses
cases in which such strategies with ∆ = 0 appear to be rather trivial.
Of course, both X and Y are free to play ZD strategies; if both players play ZDextor-
tion strategies with χ > 1, their scores will be the solution to both extortion constraints:
in most games piX = piY = ∆.
13
Lastly, X might try to secure her own score independently of Y ’s actions by setting
12The normative implications of equality are not further discussed in this paper. It seems obvious that
χ > 1 would be described as “unfair” by most observers in almost every possible application. When
used, normative language will put in double inverted commas to indicate metaphorical use of the
terms while applied to the theoretical phenomena discussed here.
13Let ∆i denote the offset chosen by i ∈ X,Y , and assume χi > 1. Then a simple calculation to solve
the two resulting ZD constraints shows that the player choosing the smaller offset will outperform
the other. Thus, ∆X = ∆Y will be a rational assumption when ∆ has a lower bound. Then both
constraints are satisfied when piX = piY = ∆, regardless of extortion factors.
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β = 0. Not surprisingly, this is not possible in most interesting games (such as the
common ones covered here).14
2.4. Exemplary ZD strategies in 2x2 games
Possible parameters for ZD strategies in the four games exemplified here are summa-
rized in table 2.1, where p˜iY denotes Y ’s expected average payoff to be enforced by X’s
ZDmischief strategy, and ∆ and χ are used as parameters of ZDextortion strategies as
previously introduced. The table also gives one numeric example for each strategy in
each game, with payoffs as introduced in section 1.1. For the example of an infinitely
iterated Game of Chicken, exemplary and average gameplay of the derived strategies is
also presented. The derivation of feasible parameters can be found in appendix A, where
ranges are provided for a general symmetric game and a general iBS.
2.4.1. Feasible parameters
“Fair” extortion strategies with χ = 1 exist for all games analyzed here (and χ = 1
implies that ∆ is canceled out). In appendix A it is shown that such strategies exist in
all quantitatively symmetric and in general Battle of the Sexes games, and it is clear
that they can be construed by adapting parameters in ordinally symmetric games (where
the ZD constraint would then intersect the payoffs from (up, up) and (down, down), cf.
fig. 2.1). This result is in line with more general theorems proved for a memory-1
imitate-the-best strategy in [Duersch/Oechssler/Schipper]. Press and Dyson note that
tit-for-tat is a special case of ZDextortion strategies in symmetric games with χ = 1:
TFT is p = (1, 0, 1, 0)ᵀ, one of the limit values of eq. (2.5) [Press/Dyson, p. 3].
In symmetric games, and particularly in those three analyzed here, a mischievous
X may unilaterally force piY to any value between Y ’s pure strategy maximin payoff
(r = max{S, P}) and the lower of his two highest payoffs (s := min{R, T}).
14A straightforward calculation following constraint eq. (2.5) shows that in this case p is only in the
realm of possibility vectors if one action is “wantlessly dominant,” i.e. all possible outcomes when
choosing one action are better than all other possible outcomes when playing the other (sX1,2 
sX3,4 , or vice versa). In that case, X could choose a fixed piX to achieve in the long run by mixing
between the dominant and the dominated strategy—neither such a strategy nor games with such
strongly dominant strategies seem particularly interesting, since playing anything but the dominant
strategy would seem irrational.
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For ZDextortion strategies in symmetric games, there is no upper bound on the
extortion factor χ when adequate s ≥ ∆ ≥ r is chosen. Therefore X may decide to skew
virtually all surplus payoff on the maximin payoff from Y . Choosing an offset ∆ smaller
than the maximin payoff is possible if and only if P ≤ ∆ < r: then χ has an upper
bound. This is the case in iGC as defined here (where r = S > P ). Thus, for ∆ = 0 to
be possible, P ≤ 0 must hold, and if r > 0, χ will have upper bounds which will then
give the edges of the set of feasible payoffs.
For illustration, assume the case of limit values, i.e. ∆ = P < S and χ = (T−∆)/(S−
∆). Then the resulting ZD constraint is rather trivial: it is the lower edge of the set
of feasible payoffs (the line (down, down) −→ (down, up) in fig. 2.1), the same one which
could be obtained by simply always playing down. Indeed, the resulting ZDextortion
strategy with these limit parameters will play up for a finite number of iterations and
will then continue to play down forever (p = (p1, p2, 0, 0)
ᵀ, with p2 < p1 < 1). In fig. 2.1,
I give a graphical interpretation of feasible parameters for extortion strategies.
In Battle of the Sexes games, no ZDmischief strategies exist, and extortion is generally
limited by upper and lower bounds.15 ZDextortion strategies with χ > 1 only exist in
iBS games if C = L; they have the same characteristic highlighted above for iGC: if they
exist at all, they will give the edges of the set of feasible payoffs in their limit values.
15This may provide some insights into why X and Y continue to be fascinated by them. Romantically,
χ < 1 is possible in iBS games, unlike in symmetric games.
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Game of ChickenpiY
piX
(up, down)*
(mixed)*
(down, up)*
Figure 2.1.: Graphical representation of feasible ZDextortion strategies for X
Note: Three kinds of ZDextortion strategies are illustrated: the dark blue line represents the feasible
range for offsets ∆. The colored dots give three values for ∆ along with feasible ranges for the extortion
factor χ (represented by the colored arcs) and the resulting constraints for one particular value of χ
(the lines). When ∆ = r (orange), χ may take any value from [1,∞[, enabling the ZD constraint to be
almost flat. When a smaller ∆ is chosen, the set of feasible payoffs imposes an upper bound on χ, and
in the extreme case of ∆ = P (light blue), X’s strategy is equivalent to always playing down. Finally,
∆ is shown at its upper limit value ∆ = R (green). Asterisks mark stage game Nash equilibria.
2.4.2. Typical gameplay
ZD strategies typically “work” very fast, yielding average scores that are psychologically
“close enough” to the expected values within a few hundred iterations of the game.16
Figures 2.2 to 2.4 present exemplary gameplay in iGC:17 one single game is compared
to an average over 10,000 games to show typical and average convergence of payoffs. All
panels show games in which X plays a numerical ZD strategy provided in table 2.1. In
the first two panels, they play a randomizer strategy Y which plays each move with equal
probability, i.e. q = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5)ᵀ. It should be noted that convergence against the
16An interactive javascript-website impressively demonstrates this by offering a simple iPD game to
play [Houston].
17The simulation code used to obtain this data can be found in appendix B.2.
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randomizer strategy is relatively slow, compared to other strategies (see section 2.5
below).
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Figure 2.2.: iGC games: ZDmischief with p˜iY = 2.5 vs. randomizer
Note: single game: (s
(7000)
X , s
(7000)
Y ) ≈ (3.63, 2.43). On average over 10,000 games, they are (3.64, 2.50).
The third panel shows the extortionate strategy X against tit-for-tat Y , which in
effect is a game between two ZDextortion strategies, one with ∆ = 2, χ = 10 and one
with χ = 1. Both resulting constraints are satisfied for the expected average payoffs of
piX = piY = 2. It is interesting to note that the extortionerX has a slightly higher average
score in the first few hundred iterations, which stems from her initiation of defection
against the cooperative TFT. However, this small advantage is quickly averaged over
as more iterations are played. This example demonstrates a more general truth: two
extortioners with χ > 1 competing against each other will generally earn very mediocre
payoffs, as a simple calculation following the two ZD constraints shows.
All panels demonstrate that iterated games between probabilistic strategies are sto-
chastic processes: every single iterated game has entirely different gameplay, and in (very
unlikely) singular cases gameplay may deviate completely from the examples shown here:
it is possible, if not likely, that (up, up) is played for any finite duration of gameplay.
The average over many games shows a very strict convergence, however. This is further
discussed in the following section.
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Figure 2.3.: iGC games: ZDextortion with χ = 10,∆ = 2 vs. randomizer
Note: single game: (s
(7000)
X , s
(7000)
Y ) ≈ (3.62, 2.18). On average over 10,000 games, they are (3.61, 2.16).
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Figure 2.4.: iGC games: ZDextortion with χ = 10,∆ = 2 vs. TFT
Note: single game: (s
(7000)
X , s
(7000)
Y ) ≈ (2.00, 2.00). On average over 10,000 games, they are (2.00, 2.00).
24
2.5. Convergence speed of ZD strategies
The existence and behavior of ZD strategies has been proven and analyzed for in-
finitely iterated 2x2 games; regardless of whether ZDmischief or ZDextortion strate-
gies are played, the expected average payoffs of the infinitely iterated game, piX and piY ,
are given by eq. (2.3) as a function of p and q, both players’ memory-1 strategies (or Y ’s
equivalent memory-1 strategy, if he plays a longer-memory strategy).
However, even with the rationalization discussed earlier (i.e. no player ever certainly
knows a single iteration to be the last one), human actors in economic applications of
the model will be interested in how quickly they may expect to see the average payoffs
converge: in what time frame may one expect the ZD constraints to be “almost satis-
fied”? While it has been shown analytically that playing a ZD strategy will guarantee
the intended linear constraint in the (very) long run, it is interesting to ask how close
to the limit value of the payoff convergence a player can get within finite time spans.18
For this reason, the convergence speed of ZD strategies is of interest: how quickly
can one assume the average payoffs to be within a reasonable neighborhood of the limit
in the infinitely iterated game? Since the convergence of ZD strategies is due to the
convergence of Markov chains, this question can be answered by Markov chain theory.
The mean ergodic theorem [Stroock, Aˆ§2.3.1] can be applied to show that (with
notation as introduced above)
E
[
(s¯
(t)
i − pi(∞)i )2
]
≤ C
t
(2.6)
for i ∈ X, Y , where C is a constant determined by the Markov transition matrix (and
thus by p and q) and the payoff vectors. To be precise, knowing that A4 has at least
one column of non-zero elements (see appendix B.1)
C = 6 ∗ sˆ2i ∗ −1 (2.7)
18It is noted that in terms of classical game theory the game must be “infinitely iterated” at least in so
far that the players do not know when it will end. If one iteration can be made out to be the last,
always playing down follows as only rational strategy from backwards induction. This phenomenon
is known as the Chainstore paradox [Rasmusen, pp. 128ff.].
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Here, sˆi denotes the largest possible stage game payoff for player i, and  > 0 is the
minimum element of any column in A4. For example, in iGC between the ZDextortion
strategy provided in table 2.1 and AllU (the strategy always playing up), C ≈ 645; the
same strategy against randomizer yields C ≈ 1333: it is clear that this theoretic and
general result is too broad an approximation to impress “human actors” (very roughly
speaking, these values imply that the average scores after 1000 iterations can be expected
to be within ±1 of the expected average scores of the infinitely repeated game).
Additionally, no statement can be made stronger than the expected value of the
deviation: when p and q are kept general and t < ∞, s¯(t)i can theoretically take any
value from the convex set of feasible payoffs; deviation from the expected value pii (the
convergence limit) is just increasingly unlikely for large t. Nonetheless, the strong law of
large numbers guarantees that in an average over a large number of independent iterated
games, (s¯
(t)
i − pi(∞)i )2 ≤ Ct will hold. This result over a large number of games can be
observed in figs. 2.2 to 2.5, where the average payoffs over 10,000 games show a strong
continuous convergence—the simulations also suggest that convergence is much faster
than implied by the general results: maybe this data will bear more attractiveness for
real-world players.
Lastly, since the stationary distribution pi of the Markov chain depends on the strate-
gies p and q being fixed, it could be assumed that by continuously changing his strategy
q, Y may actually evade the convergence of payoffs: by “playing inside the equilibration
timescale,” Y might try to “keep the game out of Markov equilibrium” [Press/Dyson,
p. 4]. An argument similar to that in section 2.1 shows that this is impossible: any
variation of strategies, rapid as it may be, can be averaged over to obtain an equivalent,
fixed memory-1 strategy, which suffices for the Markov chain to converge. Press and
Dyson present a formal proof of this idea [Press/Dyson, appx B].
However, the results derived in this section highlight another aspect: the convergence
speed of the Markov chain depends on both X’s and Y ’s strategy choice. If the game
continues for infinitely long, this will be irrelevant, since pii does not depend on conver-
gence speed; if the players have time preferences, or if the infinite game has a positive
probability of ending in every iteration (signified by δ < 1), however, they may find
retardation of convergence attractive in any iteration t < ∞. This result is further
discussed in the following section.
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2.6. Best responses to ZD strategies
If X is to play a ZD strategy, what is the best reaction for Y ? Under the assumptions
made, Y would be interested in q¯ := arg maxq piY (p,q). Recall that this implies that
δ = 1, i.e. Y has no time preferences: he values future payoffs exactly as much as
present ones (and therefore maximizes the simple average over all iterations). Of course,
this is a strong assumption; for this section to be formally correct, we will now also
consider time preferences, i.e. δ < 1.19
A comparable measure to pii = pi
(∞)
i as previously used is given by the expected
average payoff over all stage games to come, weighted by time preference [Eichberger,
pp. 210f.], defined as (cf. eq. (1.1))
Pˆi(p,q) := (1− δ) ∗
∞∑
t=1
δt−1E [pii,t(p,q)]=̂
( ∞∑
t=1
δt−1
)−1
∗ E [Pi(σX , σY )] (2.8)
where notation is simplified by defining a random variable pii,t(p,q) as “player i’s stage
game payoff in iteration t, given both players’ probabilistic strategies.”
Thus, if time-indifferent, Y will try to choose q¯. If he has time preferences, Y will
try to choose qˆ := arg maxq PˆY (p,q). It should be noted that for δ small enough, our
analysis becomes irrelevant: when Y does not care much about the implications his
action in iteration t has in iteration t + 1 (viz. impacting X’s future choice of action
through her memory-1 strategy p), the infinitely iterated game effectively becomes an
infinite series of unconnected stage games. I thus assume δ to be in a range where ZD
analysis is still relevant, and focus on the implications of δ < 1. With these assumptions,
best response strategies q¯ and qˆ, and other responses that might be deemed “best” are
now discussed for different ZD strategies.
In the case of ZDmischief strategies, Y ’s expected average score piY will be fixed to
p˜iY regardless of his strategy choice (including, as shown in section 2.1, more elaborate
strategies): there simply is no best response per se. Y might choose to deliberately keep
piX low, hoping to make X stop her mischief—but by itself this will have no impact on
Y ’s score whatsoever. If Y has time preferences, however, the results from section 2.5
imply that by choosing an appropriate strategy qˆ, Y is able to slow convergence down.
19We will not relax the assumption of risk neutrality (see footnote 9).
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Since he values present payoffs higher than distant ones (and since the value of very
distant payoffs is limt→∞ δt−1pii,t = 0), such strategies may be best responses for him—
the concrete answer depending on δ, p, and sY . Thus, for ZDmischief strategies, best
responses will exist for δ < 1. Otherwise Y will be indifferent between all strategies.
Now assume that X plays a ZDextortion strategy with small ∆ and χ ≥ 1. Then
Y ’s best response q¯ ensures that X will get a multiple: since X imposes the constraint
(piX − ∆) = χ(piY − ∆), Y ’s maximization of his expected average score makes sure
that X will be better off. In all games analyzed here, this leads Y to always play up
(AllU), yielding a payoff distribution on the right-hand edge of the set of feasible payoffs
in fig. 2.1: by following nothing but his private interests, Y can only play in the hands
of the extortioner. Regardless of how large χ < ∞ is, Y will be better off making his
extortioner rich than keeping both players poor.
If Y has time preferences, two cases are possible: if δ is large enough, the dynamic
leading Y to fully committing to his extortioner (e.g. by playing AllU) will work when
Y maximizes PˆY as well. When δ is too small, the promise of gaining piY > r over many
future iterations will not suffice, and Y should revert to more short-term strategies.
That is, δ < 1 puts another constraint on the maximum extortion factor, if X intends to
successfully extort Y . Of course, the above remark on the possibility (and desirability)
of convergence retarding strategies applies to ZDextortion strategies as well.
Naturally, giving in to X’s mischief or extortion will disappoint some players, even
if it presents the best response by private interest. Suppose, for example, Y exhibits a
sense of justice (or social preferences) and refuses to contribute to X’s “unfair” extortion:
by defecting (or playing a ZD strategy himself), he can enforce the “fair” but mediocre
payoffs piX = piY = ∆. Thus, ZD strategies in 2x2 games resemble an iterated ultimatum
game, where (any) one player might be tempted to enforce an unequal distribution of
payoffs, and the other is left with the decision to either comply or sacrifice own payoff.
Similarly to the ultimatum game, the standard best response is to accept any “immoral”
offer that is at least slightly better than the maximin payoff, despite a multitude of
empirical observations confirming experiment subjects to tend to more equal splits (cf.
[Rasmusen, pp. 358ff.]. See also [Huck/Oechssler] for a description of circumstances
that may drive X towards a more equal split by herself).
An important difference to the original ultimatum game is that in playing against a
ZDextortion strategy with ∆ = r, χ > 1 there exist so far unstudied responses which
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present a stronger retaliation than merely falling back to maximin payoffs: if any stage
game strategy combination exists yielding lower payoffs than maximin for both players,
Y can choose a strategy such that piY < ∆. In this case, the extortionist’s constraint on
expected scores, (piX −∆) = χ(piY −∆), backfires, as he will then receive less than Y .
Thus, the extortionist is herself liable to extortion.
Such retaliation depends on the possibility of achieving piY < ∆. For iGC as defined
here, an example of retaliation is shown in fig. 2.5, where the ZDextortion strategy
provided above plays against AllD (the strategy always playing down), and the ZD
constraint is satisfied by piX < piY < ∆ = r. However, a savvy extortionist can anticipate
this reaction and avoid choosing ∆ = r, settling for ∆ = P and an upper constraint on
his extortion.
Retaliation is feasible whenever D(pZD,q,sY )
D(pZD,q,1)
= piY < ∆ yields a valid probability vector
q. Knowing that ∆ is bounded below in P for symmetric games, the feasibility of
retaliation then depends on S being relatively small: if and only if (T + S) < 2P ,
there exist payoff combinations lower than P , viz. combinations between (down, up) and
(up, down). In such cases, even the extortion strategy with the lowest possible offset
∆ = P is itself subject to extortion.
While the conventionally-valued iPD game analyzed by Press and Dyson does not
allow this, differently valued iPD games do: if S is relatively small, (T + S) < 2P
holds.20 Of course, this can also hold in iSH games. In iBS games, such retaliation is
not possible, since (F +D) > 2C is implied by definition.
Interestingly, in a simulated tournament of several well-known strategies in the con-
ventionally-valued iPD, Stewart and Plotkin report a strategy obtained by setting ∆ = R
to be particularly successful in terms of average score [Stewart/Plotkin]. This strategy
effectively vows to suffer more from every deviation from mutual cooperation than its
opponent: it can easily be exploited (by choosing a strategy to earn any average payoff
piY < R). It can only be assumed that the success of Stewart and Plotkin’s strategy
depends heavily on the zoo of strategies playing.
20Take, for example, the modified iPD game with payoffs (R,S, T, P )mPD = (10, 0, 11, 9). In this
game, any ZDextortion strategy will be outperformed by the randomizer strategy. E.g., for p =
(0.91, 0.71, 0.92, 0)ᵀ, an extortioner with ∆ = P = 9, χ = 10, the expected average scores are
piX ≈ 6.46, and piY ≈ 8.75.
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Figure 2.5.: iGC games: ZDextortion with χ = 10,∆ = 2 vs. AllD
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2.7. ZD strategies and the Folk theorem
The Folk theorem guarantees the existence of Nash equilibria for a convex set of average
payoffs. Therefore, it guarantees Nash equilibria for cooperative payoff distributions as
well as for payoffs which could be described as “unfair,” such as F in fig. 2.6: provided δ
is close enough to 1, a grim trigger strategy exists to stabilize F as the average payoff of
a Nash equilibrium in the infinitely iterated game. Assume X plays this strategy, then
Y is confronted with the choice to either comply and receive on average slightly more
than P , or to play his maximin strategy, receiving s¯
(∞)
Y = P .
By contrast, F can also be achieved when X plays a ZD strategy (either mischievous
and extortionate), provided Y plays the appropriate strategy in response. In this case,
however, F will not be the result of a Nash equilibrium: suppose X plays a ZDmischief
strategy to yield piY = p˜iY = FY (where FY denotes the Y coordinate of F, i.e. Y ’s
expected average payoff if the Nash equilibrium yielding F were played), and Y chooses
his strategy such that piX = FX . Then Y will be indifferent to his strategy choice (as
discussed earlier), but X will generally be able to increase her payoff (e.g. by playing
AllD). Thus, F will not be an equilibrium situation.
Note that Y is free to play a ZDmischief strategy himself. Then any combination
of two ZDmischief strategies is a Nash equilibrium in the infinitely iterated game with
δ large enough, for no player can increase his score by changing his strategy. In an
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interview, Press notes that this property might be exploited to form cooperative treaties
ensuring both parties maximum average payoffs while minimizing incentives to break
the treaty [Press].
Now assume that X plays a ZDextortion strategy, enforcing a linear constraint on
which F lies. Then Y can increase his score by moving along the constraint to the outer
edge of feasible payoffs (assumed δ is large enough). Suppose Y does indeed follow
these incentives to play AllU. Then despite X’s very successful extortion, the resulting
strategy combination is not a Nash equilibrium, for X would again be tempted to play
e.g. AllD.
Thus, the outcomes of iterated games with ZD strategies will generally not be Nash
equilibria (with the notable exception of two ZDmischief strategies), even if the exact
same outcomes could be achieved via Nash equilibrium strategies guaranteed by the
Folk theorem.
If any desirable outcome achieved by ZD strategies could have been achieved using
the Folk theorem, then what is their merit? Aside from the theoretical groundwork they
provide, i.e. reporting that rather simple memory-1 strategies can collapse the set of
possible scores to arbitrary linear constraints, their primary advantage lies not in stating
that a certain strategy combination, if ever achieved, presents an equilibrium situation,
but in stating how such situations are reached in the long run. This is especially explicit
for ZDextortion strategies:
Assume X plays a ZDextortion strategy with χ > 1 and small ∆. Further assume Y is
a “mindless global maximizer”, i.e. Y simply tries to maximize his private payoff as best
as he can, without trying to change X’s behavior. Then if Y knows X’s strategy, he will
always play his best response, yielding both players (“unfairly” distributed) maximum
payoffs.
Now assume that Y is less witting: he either does not know X’s strategy (i.e. he
observes her actions, but does not know p), or he is for some reason unable to imme-
diately find a best response (he cannot solve the complex maximization problem, e.g.).
Then Y can be called a “mindless local maximizer”, i.e. he will try to maximize his
expected private payoff in a “trial-and-error”-like fashion by gradually changing parts
of his strategy and observing the impacts on his payoff. Press and Dyson suggest that
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Figure 2.6.: Various ZD strategies and the Folk Theorem in iPD
Note: The Nash equilibria guaranteed by the Folk Theorem (dark blue) and various ZD constraints
(orange). z1 represents a ZDmischief strategy; z2 is a standard ZDextortion strategy with ∆ = P . As
χ → ∞, this line will become almost parallel to the piX -axis. z3 is an impossible ZD strategy: for
certain parameters the ZD constraints cannot be imposed on the game (since Y does, after all, choose
his strategy himself; see fig. 2.1). z4 is a “fair” extortion strategy (such as TFT) with χ = 1. F , finally,
is the outcome of one particular Nash equilibrium strategy guaranteed by the Folk theorem (one that
could be called extortionate).
in many games, a strictly positive gradient leads Y from this situation towards AllU,21
i.e. ∂piY
∂q
> 0 for any q [Press/Dyson, pp. 3f.].22
If this is indeed the case, then instead of stating that F can be the outcome of a Nash
21Note that the same holds true for the case of TFT (a special ZD strategy).
22There is an important implication here: assuming Y to maximize either piY (p,q) or PˆY (p,q), whether
locally or globally, implies that Y has full knowledge of p, or remembers enough outcomes to make an
adequate estimate of it. In particular, not all adaptive strategies will be drawn to AllU: consider the
case of learner strategies, such as reinforcement learners or impulse learners [Chmura/Goerg/Selten].
Since such strategies adapt to their observations of how successful certain strategy choices were in
the past, they fail to recognize infinitesimal advantages that only matter in the infinite time horizon
(the action aY in the t-th iteration changes the probability distribution over S in all following
iterations). Learner strategies will thus generally fail to be lead to AllU.
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equilibrium, it can now be stated that F will be achieved if Y adapts his strategy to
react to the environment enforced by X’s ZD strategy.
Hence, by contrast to the equilibria guaranteed by the Folk theorem, ZD strategies do
not present their opponent with an “all-or-nothing”-choice. Instead, they impose a linear
constraint and allow their opponent to move freely along it, hoping to provide enough
incentives to nudge him towards favorable behavior. By choosing a ZD strategy, players
generally decide against a myopically better alternative to maintain the “carrot-and-
stick” logic leading their opponent towards exploitable behavior. As such, ZD strategies
defeat the logic of Nash equilibria and the Folk theorem: they simply have different
intentions.
Choosing to play ZD strategies generally appears to be the choice of a very conscious
player whose reasoning goes beyond the logic of Nash equilibria: the formal argument
that playing a ZD strategy is mostly not a best reply would probably not concern a true
extortioner who realizes that by changing his strategy he also changes the strategy of his
best-response-playing opponent. In a way, ZD strategies are thus exploiting economic
rationality, at least the prevalent ceteris paribus kind: ZD strategies, in classic economic
terms “irrational,” exploit best responders.
Any ZD strategy player X who sticks to her strategy, discarding other “best re-
sponses,” will likely have a theory of mind [Press/Dyson, p. 3]. As such, her choice
of playing a ZD strategy will depend on whether she attributes her opponent, Y , the
same meta-cognitive capabilities [Ravenscroft]: if both players have a theory of mind,
both might refuse to give in to their opponent’s extortion, resulting in a long ultimatum
game where both players constantly decline the unfair share offered, resulting in very
low scores for both (or, more optimistically put, both players will at some point arrive
at a “fair” distribution). The success of any ZD strategy thus depends on properties of
its opponent that lie beyond the definition of the infinitely iterated game.
33
3. Evolutionary Competition
Until now, we merely discussed the existence of ZD strategies, and their implications
if X were to play one. We were interested in how the discovery of ZD strategies can
“change the game,” simply supposing that X be mischievous enough to choose a ZD
strategy. What we did not ask yet is, “why would X want to play a ZD strategy?”
Of course, as discussed in sections 2.6 and 2.7, if X possesses a superior theory of
mind and knows Y to mindlessly maximize his score, ZDextortion strategies allow her
extraordinarily high payoffs. Another possible area for applications of ZD strategies is
evolutionary game theory.
The analyses of classic economics are usually ceteris paribus : everything else equal,
actors prefer to have more private welfare rather than less. The individual’s environment
is thus taken as exogenous and fixed: often, however, “the environment of an individual is
itself composed of other individuals who are subject to the same forces of [competition]”
[Weibull, p. xiii]. Suppose the iterated game X is playing is a competition, e.g. for
market dominance or for “employee of the month” status. Then X will realize that
her success in the competition may depend on the peculiarities of her environment
at the very time-instant of her move: market success of a firm depends not only on
the quality of its products but also on what alternatives are competing for the same
market. The possibility of standing out in the workplace depends just as much on how
hard the coworkers are trying as on own effort. In economic competition, much like in
evolutionary biology, the winner is not always the optimal candidate, but simply the one
that outperforms the others.
To enable analysis for this paradigm, the field of evolutionary game theory was de-
veloped, both by economists and evolutionary biologists [Weibull]. One implication of
modeling competitive situations in selective environments (such as markets or evolu-
tion) is that the assumption of well-informed, “global maximizer” agents is dropped:23
23The assumption that agents possess only very limited cognitive abilities and information stems from
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competitors do not know what the optimal response to their environment is (because it
constantly changes, for example), and are thus forced to try out different alternatives:
the selective forces of evolution then weed out unlucky tries.24
Replicator dynamics are a standard tool of evolutionary game theory encapsulating
these ideas: they state that at any point in time the growth rate of a population share
using a certain strategy equals the difference between that strategy’s payoff and the
complete population’s average payoff [Weibull, p. 73]. The goal for an optimal strategy
is thus shifted from finding a global maximum in private welfare to trying to earn more
than others to ensure its (genetic, market) survival and dominance. When the global
maximum is not known, one cannot be certain that one cannot be outperformed by an
opponent. Then it becomes rational to try to make sure that one’s opponents earn less
than oneself, even if this is only possible at a personal cost.
In this environment, ZDextortion strategies with χ > 1 are of particular interest:
suppose the total population of strategies consists of an incumbent strategy representing
a large share of the population and an invader strategy which is only a small part of the
population (such an invader may be the result of biological mutation, business innovation
or migration in spatial models). Then by making sure that the invader receives smaller
payoffs, the incumbent may protect itself against the invader. Conversely, by enforcing
higher payoffs for itself, the invader may win an upper hand over an incumbent.
The available literature shows that the evolutionary success of ZDextortion strategies
is rather limited [Adami/Hintze, Hilbe/Nowak/Sigmund]. This is due to the fact that
ZDextortion strategies with χ > 1 do not fare well against each other: for illustration,
imagine an evolutionary tournament of iPD: players are allotted a fixed strategy and
reproduce depending on their payoffs. Suppose an incumbent population playing any
biologists studying the evolution of lower animals. It may however be quite applicable in some
asymmetric economic contexts as well: “The lower animals are less likely than humans to think
about the strategies of their opponents at each stage of a game. Their strategies are more likely to
be preprogrammed and their strategy sets more restricted than the businessman’s, if perhaps not
more so than his customer’s” [Rasmusen, p. 143].
24It should be noted that Press and Dyson applied the term “evolutionary” to a “mindless local maxi-
mizer” strategy, i.e. to a player who adapts his strategy to optimize his payoff within his environment
(“fitness landscape”). While closely related, this use is misleading in the context of evolutionary
game theory, where players stick to their strategies, and it instead is evolutionary mutation and
selection which leads to what could be called “local maximization.” Particularly, the difference is
whether the ZD player is herself subject to evolutionary selection. Press and Dyson’s use of “evo-
lutionary” is more apt in the context of the iterated game tournaments described in section 1.4:
[Stewart/Plotkin] gives a first analysis of ZD strategies in this context.
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strategy INC is invaded by a small group of ZDextortion players. Assume the ZD
players to have chosen ∆ = P, χ = 10: then in playing against each other, they will
receive uZD(ZD) = ∆, where I define ux(y) as an auxiliary function giving the payoff
of strategy x when playing against strategy y. By partially giving in to extortion, the
incumbent can achieve uINC(ZD) ≥ P . Therefore, the extortioner will do worse against
itself than the incumbent to be extorted: it is clear that under these circumstances
no ZDextortion strategy can ever drive an incumbent to extinction [Adami/Hintze]. In
particular, if the incumbent is a TFT strategy, it will achieve cooperative payoffs against
itself while uZD(ZD) = uZD(TFT) = ∆. Thus, a ZD strategy cannot outperform TFT
in evolutionary contests. Against some strategies, however, ZD strategies will be able
to successfully invade a population and maintain a stable share ω < 1 there.25
To improve the evolutionary performance of ZD strategies, kin selection mecha-
nisms have been discussed: if the population of ZDextortion strategies could identify
those players playing the same strategy (i.e. realize that their opponent also has
a theory of mind), they could play more cooperative strategies against each other.
For a more detailed account of the evolutionary performance of ZD strategies, see
[Hilbe/Nowak/Sigmund].
25Suppose, for example the incumbent plays AllU. Then the invading extortioners will successfully
outperform the “naive” incumbent, growing in population share. As this happens, however, the
frequency of ZD strategies playing each other will increase, lowering their average score. At some
point, the extortionate population will receive the same average score as the “naive” population,
yielding a stable population share. To be concise, let ω be the share of ZD players (then 1 − ω is
the share of AllU players). Then by solving the equations for average score we obtain ωuZD(ZD) +
(1− ω)uZD(AllU) = ωuAllU(ZD) + (1− ω)uAllU(AllU)
⇒ ω = uZD(AllU)− uAllU(AllU)
uZD(AllU)− uAllU(AllU)) + uAllU(ZD)− uZD(ZD) < 1
Note that this does not take into account mutation dynamics, which further contribute to making
ZD strategies unstable.
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4. Discussion
Some of the popular reception of ZD strategies has been hyperbolic: one (likely influen-
tial) example of this is [Poundstone]: “Press and Dyson have shown that cleverness and
unfairness triumph after all [...] [They]’re showing how to fake out evolution!” As dis-
cussed in this paper, the performance of ZD strategies is highly dependent on a number
of conditions, and ZD strategies will not generally be successful in unpredictable tour-
naments; in particular, in evolutionary settings as defined in evolutionary game theory,
ZD strategies are not overly successful. By noting that TFT-like strategies generally
perform better than other ZD strategies in contexts where strategies are forced to play
against themselves as well as others, it is safe to say that extortionate ZD strategies do
not end the reign of “cooperative” strategies like TFT.
In “evolutionary” settings as defined by Press and Dyson (ZD versus mindless max-
imizers), strategies that rationally adapt to their environment can successfully be ex-
ploited, however: this may be interpreted as a good reason against pure ceteris paribus
maximization.
The study of ZD strategies enables exciting new perspectives in the study of iterated
2x2 games. While their existence is not entirely surprising (as suggested by section 2.7),
and their performance highly dependent on factors both inside (payoff matrix) and out-
side the iterated game (theory of mind), ZD strategies highlight important mechanisms
in iterated games: the role of memory; classical equilibrium selection and maximizing
paths along payoff gradients; the importance of “uncorrelated asymmetries,” viz. the
question who sets his strategy first and who reacts to it; constraints on both players’
payoffs, both trivial (such as AllD) and nontrivial; and many more. Not least of these,
the exploitability of “mindless economic maximizers” by a player with a mind is an
interesting philosophical datum to ponder about—as is the reassuring result that in
evolutionary contexts mischief and extortion are limited by their own “evil.”
37
List of Figures
1.1. The Folk theorem: feasible Nash equilibria in iPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1. Graphical representation of feasible ZDextortion strategies for X . . . . . 22
2.2. iGC games: ZDmischief with p˜iY = 2.5 vs. randomizer . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3. iGC games: ZDextortion with χ = 10,∆ = 2 vs. randomizer . . . . . . . 24
2.4. iGC games: ZDextortion with χ = 10,∆ = 2 vs. TFT . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5. iGC games: ZDextortion with χ = 10,∆ = 2 vs. AllD . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.6. Various ZD strategies and the Folk Theorem in iPD . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
List of Tables
1.1. A symmetric 2x2 game payoff matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. Payoffs in the Battle of the Sexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Possible ZD strategies in common 2x2 games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
38
Bibliography
[Adami/Hintze] Adami C and Hintze A: Winning Isn’t Everything: Evolutionary Sta-
bility of Zero Determinant Strategies. In: Nature Communications, in review. 2012.
[Akin] Akin E: Stable Cooperative Solutions for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Un-
published. Submitted to ArXiv Dynamical Systems on 5 Nov, preprint available at
http://arxiv.org/abs/1211.0969. 2012.
[Axelrod-a] Axelrod R: The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books. 1984.
[Axelrod-b] Axelrod R: The Complexity of Cooperation. Agent-Based Models of Com-
petition and Collaboration. Princeton University Press. 1997.
[Bartlett] Barlett T: To the Trickster Go the Spoils. In: The Chronicle of Higher
Education Percolator Blog. Accessible online at http://chronicle.com/blogs/
percolator/to-the-trickster-go-the-spoils/30940. 2012.
[Boerlijst/Nowak/Sigmund] Boerlijst MC, Nowak MA, and Sigmund K: Equal Pay for
All Prisoners. In: The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 104, No. 4. 1997.
[Dawes] Dawes RM: Social Dilemmas. In: Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. 31. 1980.
[Droesser] Droesser C: Der einsame Gewinner. In: Die ZEIT, Vol. 36/2012. Accessi-
ble online at http://www.zeit.de/2012/36/Gefangenendilemma-Spieltheorie.
2012.
[Duersch/Oechssler/Schipper] Duersch P, Oechssler J, and Schipper B: Unbeatable Im-
itation. In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 76. 2012.
[Eichberger] Eichberger J: Game Theory for Economists. JAI Press. 2007.
[Gibbons] Gibbons R: Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton University
Press. 1958.
[Hilbe/Nowak/Sigmund] Hilbe C, Nowak MA, and Sigmund K: The Evolution of Ex-
tortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games. Unpublished. Submitted to ArXiv
Quantitative Biology on 5 Dec, preprint available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1212.
39
1067. 2012.
[Huck/Oechssler] Huck S and Oechssler J: The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Ex-
plaining Fair Allocations. In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 28. 1999.
[Hoffmann] Hoffmann R: Twenty Years on. The Evolution of Cooperation Revisited. In:
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Vol. 3, No. 2. 2000.
[Houston] Houston R: The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Press-Dyson Interactive. Inter-
active online game, accessible at http://s3.boskent.com/prisoners-dilemma/
fixed.html. 2012.
[Kemeny] Kemeny J and Snell L: Finite Markov Chains. Undergraduate Texts in Math-
ematics. Springer. 1976.
[Nowak/Sigmund] Nowak M and Sigmund K: A Strategy of Win-Stay, Lose-Shift that
Outperforms Tit-for-Tat in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. In: Nature, Vol. 364.
1993.
[Prase] “Prase” (username): LessWrong.com iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma Tourna-
ment. Accessible online at http://lesswrong.com/lw/7f2/prisoners_dilemma_
tournament_results/. 2011.
[Press] Press WH: William Press Responds to William Poundstone. Inter-
view on Edge.org, accessible online at http://edge.org/conversation/
on-iterated-prisoner-dilemma. 2012.
[Poundstone] William Poundstone: On Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Contains
Strategies that Dominate any Evolutionary Opponent. Edge Commentary.
Accessible online at http://edge.org/conversation/on-iterated-prisoner’
s-dilemma-contains-strategies-that-dominate-any-evolutionary. 2012.
[Press/Dyson] Press WH and Dyson FJ: Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Contains Strate-
gies that Dominate any Evolutionary Opponent. In: Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, Published online before print May 21. 2012.
[Rasmusen] Rasmusen E: Games and Information. An Introduction to Game Theory.
Blackwell. 2007.
[Ravenscroft] Ravenscroft I: Folk Psychology as a Theory. In: Zalta EN (ed.): The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition). Accessible online at http:
//plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/folkpsych-theory. 2010.
[Rawls] Rawls J: A Theory of Justice. Revised edition. Harvard University Press. 1999.
40
[Russell] Russell BW: Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare. George Allen and Unwin.
1959.
[Sigmund] Sigmund K: The Calculus of Selfishness. Princeton Univ Press. 2010.
[Chmura/Goerg/Selten] Chmura T, Goerg SJ, Selten R: Learning in Experimental 2x2
Games. In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 76. 2012.
[Stewart/Plotkin] Stewart AJ and Plotkin JB: Extortion and Cooperation in the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma. In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 109,
No. 26. 2012.
[Stroock] Stroock DW: An Introduction to Markov Processes. Graduate Texts in Math-
ematics 230. Springer. 2005.
[TechnologyReview] The Physics arXiv Blog: The Emerging Revolu-
tion in Game Theory. In: MIT Technology Review (Views). Ac-
cessible online at http://www.technologyreview.com/view/428920/
the-emerging-revolution-in-game-theory/. 2012.
[Weibull] Weibull JW: Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press. 1995.
41
Appendices
42
A. Derivation of ZD strategies
A.1. ZDmischief strategies
Feasible parameters for ZDmischief strategies are derived for a general symmetric game
and a general Battle of the Sexes game.
A.1.1. Symmetric games
For any symmetric game as specified in 1.1, sY = (R, T, S, P )
ᵀ. Since the goal is to
set piY = p˜iY = −γ/β, we can use eq. (2.5) with γ = −p˜iY β. This yields the general
ZDmischief strategy
p =

β(R− p˜iY ) + 1
β(T − p˜iY ) + 1
β(S − p˜iY )
β(P − p˜iY )

For symmetric games where min{R, T} ≥ max{S, P}, p is thus in the realm of proba-
bility vectors for
max{S, P} ≤ p˜iY ≤ min{R, T}
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A.1.2. General Battle of the Sexes
For any BS game as specified in 1.2, sY = (D,C, L, F )
ᵀ. Since the goal is to set
piY = p˜iY = −γ/β, we can use eq. (2.5) with γ = −p˜iY β. This yields the general
ZDmischief strategy
p =

β(D − p˜iY ) + 1
β(C − p˜iY ) + 1
β(L− p˜iY )
β(F − p˜iY )

It follows that for p to be in the realm of probability vectors,
max{C,D} ≤ p˜iY ≤ min{L, F} ∨ max{F,L} ≤ p˜iY ≤ min{C,D}
Since in BS as defined here, L ≤ C < D < F , this is impossible.
A.2. ZDextortion strategies
Feasible parameters for ZDextortion strategies are derived for a general symmetric game
and a general Battle of the Sexes game.
A.2.1. Symmetric games
For any symmetric game as specified in 1.1, sX = (R, S, T, P )
ᵀ, sY = (R, T, S, P )
ᵀ.
The goal is to set (piX − ∆) = χ(piY − ∆), which could be done using eq. (2.5) with
the γ parameter described in section 2.3. However, derivation is much clearer using the
equivalent linear combination from [Press/Dyson, p. 3]: p = φ[(sX−∆1)−χ(sY −∆1)]+
(1, 1, 0, 0)T with normalizing factor φ. This yields the general ZDextortion strategy
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p = φ

(χ− 1)(∆−R)
χ(∆− T )− (∆− S)
χ(∆− S)− (∆− T )
(χ− 1)(∆− P )
+

1
1
0
0

It is plain that for χ = 1 this is always a feasible strategy. Since max{S, P} ≤ min{R, T},
no feasible solutions exist for χ < 1, and φ be positive for χ ≥ 1. From this and the
equations for p1 and p4 follows the first constraint, P ≤ ∆ ≤ R.
The equations for p2 and p3 further imply that χ(∆− T ) ≤ (∆−S) and χ(∆−S) ≥
(∆− T ). This yields
χ ≤
∆−S∆−T ∆ > T∆−T
∆−S ∆ < S
, and χ ≥
∆−S∆−T ∆ < T∆−T
∆−S ∆ > S
Thus, for S = T , χ > 1 is not feasible. For S < ∆ < T , there is no upper bound on χ.
For ∆ > T and ∆ < S, positive upper bounds on χ exist.
Assume further that ∆ = 0. Then the equations for p1 and p4, and R > P imply that
P = 0. χ will then be confined to the range [1, T
S
].
A.2.2. General Battle of the Sexes
For any BS game as specified in 1.2, sX = (F,C, L,D)
ᵀ, sY = (D,C, L, F )
ᵀ. Analogously
to the derivation for symmetric games above, we set p = φ[(sX −∆1)− χ(sY −∆1)] +
(1, 1, 0, 0)T . This yields the general ZDextortion strategy
p = φ

χ(∆−D)− (∆− F )
(χ− 1)(∆− C)
(χ− 1)(∆− L)
χ(∆− F )− (∆−D)
+

1
1
0
0

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It is clear that for χ = 1 this is always a feasible strategy. Since max{L,C} ≤ min{D,F},
φ will be negative for χ > 0. From this and the equations for p2 and p3 we derive the
first constraint, C = ∆ = L. Then from the equations for p1 and p4 we can further
follow
∆−D
∆− F ≤ χ ≤
∆− F
∆−D
Thus, for any BS game as defined in this paper, either C = L and χ has both positive
upper and lower bounds (this romantically implies that χ < 1 is possible in iBS), or
C > L and χ = 1.
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B. Simulation codes in Java
Various parts of this paper depend on computer simulations. The following sections
include the Java codes used to obtain the results. They were compiled on Java 1.7 on
Windows 7, but should be fairly compatible.
B.1. Markov chain will converge
The following code simulates the condition given in [Stroock, Aˆ§2.2.2] to prove that
A4 := 1/4
3∑
m=0
Mm
will have at least one column with non-zero entries, where M is the Markov transition
matrix:
M =

p1q1 p1(1− q1) (1− p1)q1 (1− p1)(1− q1)
p2q3 p2(1− q3) (1− p2)q3 (1− p2)(1− q3)
p3q2 p3(1− q2) (1− p3)q2 (1− p3)(1− q2)
p4q4 p4(1− q4) (1− p4)q4 (1− p4)(1− q4)

This suffices to prove that the Markov process given by M converges: A4 gives the
average number of visits to each state in four subsequent iterations. Recalling that the
number of states #S = 4, it is clear that it is possible for the Markov chain to reach
any state within four iterations, if the state is to be reached at all. The code finds
some cases where A4 still has zero elements in every column; inspection shows that such
chains never visit all states: in this case, the chain may be analyzed using a reduced
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state set S′ ⊂ {uu, ud, du, dd}, leaving out all states which are never visited, to obtain
a transition matrix for which A4 has at least one column with no zero elements.
For illustration, take the case of p = q = (1, 0, 1, 0)ᵀ, an infinitely iterated game of
TFT vs. TFT. The stationary distribution pi then depends entirely on the starting
distribution µ1 : if the game’s first iteration turns out to be (up, up) or (down, down),
the game will forever stay in this state, yielding pi = (1, 0, 0, 0) or pi = (0, 0, 0, 1),
respectively. The chain is then reduced to a single state. If the game’s first iteration
is (up, down) or (down, up), the game will forever alternate between those two states,
yielding pi = (0, 0.5, 0.5, 0) and reducing the chain to two states. Different values for µ1
will yield linear combinations of those three vectors.
Listing B.1: MatrixMult.java
/∗∗
∗ S imu la t i on o f a Markov cha in as p r e s en t e d in Press and Dyson 2012 .
∗ We show t h a t t h e cha in w i l l converge u s ing s e c t . 2 . 2 . 2 o f S t roock 2005 , by
∗ showing t h a t A := 1/4 SUM {m=0}ˆ{3} {Mˆm} w i l l a lways have a t l e a s t one
∗ column wi th non−z e ro e n t r i e s .
∗/
package de . LarsRoemheld . MatrixMult ;
/∗∗
∗ @author Lars Roemheld
∗
∗/
public c lass Matr ixMul t ip l i ca t i on {
/∗
∗ Mu l t i p l y two matr ices , g i v en as a r ray s
∗/
stat ic double [ ] [ ] Matr ixMult iply (double a [ ] [ ] , double b [ ] [ ] ) {
int aRows = a . length ,
aColumns = a [ 0 ] . length ,
bRows = b . length ,
bColumns = b [ 0 ] . l ength ;
i f ( aColumns != bRows ) {
throw new I l l ega lArgumentExcept ion ( ”A:Rows did not match B: Columns . ” ) ;
}
double [ ] [ ] r e s u l t = new double [ aRows ] [ bColumns ] ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < aRows ; i++) { // aRow
for ( int j = 0 ; j < bColumns ; j++) { // bColumn
for ( int k = 0 ; k < aColumns ; k++) { // aColumn
r e s u l t [ i ] [ j ] += a [ i ] [ k ] ∗ b [ k ] [ j ] ;
}
}
}
return r e s u l t ;
}
stat ic double [ ] [ ] MatrixAdd (double [ ] [ ] m1, double [ ] [ ] m2) {
i f ( m1. l ength != m2. l ength ) {
throw new I l l ega lArgumentExcept ion ( ”MatrixAdd : D i f f e r e n t matrix l eng ths . ” ) ;
}
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double [ ] [ ] r e s u l t = new double [m1. l ength ] [m1 [ 0 ] . l ength ] ;
for ( int row=0; row<m1. length ; row++) {
for ( int co l =0; co l<m1[ row ] . l ength ; c o l++) {
r e s u l t [ row ] [ c o l ] = m1[ row ] [ c o l ] + m2[ row ] [ c o l ] ;
}
}
return r e s u l t ;
}
public stat ic void main ( St r ing [ ] a rgs ) {
f ina l int MAX Power = 5 ;
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ” s t a r t ed c a l c u l a t i o n s . . . ” ) ;
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ” Strategy combination that do not converge r e g a r d l e s s o f s t a r t i n g point : ” ) ;
double M[ ] [ ] = new double [ 5 ] [ 5 ] ;
double R [ ] [ ] = new double [ 5 ] [ 5 ] ;
double A [ ] [ ] = new double [ 5 ] [ 5 ] ;
double E [ ] [ ] = new double [ 5 ] [ 5 ] ; // E 4 un i t y matr ix
E [ 1 ] [ 1 ] = 1 ;
E [ 2 ] [ 2 ] = 1 ;
E [ 3 ] [ 3 ] = 1 ;
E [ 4 ] [ 4 ] = 1 ;
int maxM = −1;
// Loop through a l l r e l e v a n t p , q comb ina t ions : 1 s and 0 s
for (double p1 = 0 ; p1 <= 1; p1+=1) {
for (double p2 = 0 ; p2 <= 1; p2+=1) {
for (double p3 = 0 ; p3 <= 1; p3+=1) {
for (double p4 = 0 ; p4 <= 1; p4+=1) {
for (double q1 = 0 ; q1 <= 1; q1+=1) {
for (double q2 = 0 ; q2 <= 1; q2+=1) {
for (double q3 = 0 ; q3 <= 1; q3+=1) {
for (double q4 = 0 ; q4 <= 1; q4+=1) {
// Create Markov t r a n s i t i o n matr ix f o r p , q
// As s p e c i f i e d in Press and Dyson 2012
M[ 1 ] [ 1 ] = p1∗q1 ;
M[ 2 ] [ 1 ] = p2∗q3 ;
M[ 3 ] [ 1 ] = p3∗q2 ;
M[ 4 ] [ 1 ] = p4∗q4 ;
M[ 1 ] [ 2 ] = p1∗(1−q1 ) ;
M[ 2 ] [ 2 ] = p2∗(1−q3 ) ;
M[ 3 ] [ 2 ] = p3∗(1−q2 ) ;
M[ 4 ] [ 2 ] = p4∗(1−q4 ) ;
M[ 1 ] [ 3 ] = (1−p1 )∗ q1 ;
M[ 2 ] [ 3 ] = (1−p2 )∗ q3 ;
M[ 3 ] [ 3 ] = (1−p3 )∗ q2 ;
M[ 4 ] [ 3 ] = (1−p4 )∗ q4 ;
M[ 1 ] [ 4 ] = (1−p1)∗(1−q1 ) ;
M[ 2 ] [ 4 ] = (1−p2)∗(1−q3 ) ;
M[ 3 ] [ 4 ] = (1−p3)∗(1−q2 ) ;
M[ 4 ] [ 4 ] = (1−p4)∗(1−q4 ) ;
// A = E 4
A = E. c lone ( ) ;
// Check minimum power u n t i l A has a column s t i c t l y g r e a t e r than 0
R = E. c lone ( ) ; // R = E 4
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boolean foundNonZeroColumn = fa l se ;
powers m :
for ( int power m = 1 ; power m < MAX Power ; power m++) {
R = MatrixMult iply (M, R) ;
A = MatrixAdd (A, R) ;
for ( int j = 1 ; j<=4; j++) {
double colmin = Math . min (A [ 1 ] [ j ] , Math . min (A [ 2 ] [ j ] , Math . min (A [ 3 ] [ j ] , A [ 4 ] [ j ] ) ) ) ;
i f ( colmin > 0) {
maxM = Math .max(maxM, power m ) ;
foundNonZeroColumn = true ;
break powers m ;
}
}
}
i f ( ! foundNonZeroColumn )
{
System . out . p r in t ( ”p = ( ” + p1 + ” , ” + p2 + ” , ” + p3 + ” , ” + p4 + ” ) −− ” ) ;
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”q = ( ” + q1 + ” , ” + q2 + ” , ” + q3 + ” , ” + q4 + ” ) ” ) ;
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
i f (maxM == MAX Power)
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ” Please i n c r e a s e MAX Power . ” ) ;
else
{
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”ALL other s t r a t egy combinations w i l l converge at l e a s t over ” + maxM + ” i t e r a t i o n s . ” ) ;
}
}
}
B.2. Simulation of iterated 2x2 games
The following classes provide a framework for simulating general iterated 2x2 games.
They were used for all numerical simulations in this paper.
Listing B.2: IteratedGame.java
package de . LarsRoemheld . ItGame ;
import java . i o . ∗ ;
/∗∗
∗ This p r o j e c t p r o v i d e s a framework to s imu l a t e i t e r a t e d 2 x2 games .
∗
∗ This c l a s s use s g en e r a l imp l emen ta t i ons ( such as a ”2 x2 s t a g e game” and
∗ an ”2 x2 agen t ” . I t s imp l y c a l l s t h e f u n c t i o n a l i t y o f t h e s e c l a s s e s and
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∗ l o g s t h e game outcome .
∗
∗ @author Lars Roemheld
∗/
public c lass IteratedGame {
/∗ Def ine p a y o f f s f o r d i f f e r e n t games . Payo f f s are a r ray s which g i v e
∗ p a y o f f s f o r one s p e c i f i c agen t in t h e order
∗ agent1 / agent2 : up/up , up/down , down/up , down/down
∗/
public stat ic f ina l double PAYOFFS PD A1 [ ] = {3 , 0 , 5 , 1} ;
public stat ic f ina l double PAYOFFS PD A2 [ ] = {3 , 5 , 0 , 1} ;
private stat ic f ina l St r ing [ ] OUTCOMENAMES = {”up/up” , ”up/down” , ”down/up” , ”down/down” } ;
// Prov ide a path to a l o g f i l e f o r f i l e ou tpu t −− e l s e c on s o l e ou tpu t i s used .
private stat ic f ina l St r ing LogF i l ePre f i x = ”” ; // ”D:\\ iPD ” ;
// Number o f i t e r a t i o n s to s imu l a t e
private stat ic f ina l int ITERATIONS = 10000;
// Number o f i n d i v i d u a l games o f ITERATIONS i t e r a t i o n s to s imu l a t e
private stat ic f ina l int NGAMES = 1 ;
private stat ic Agent 2x2 agent1 ;
private stat ic Agent 2x2 agent2 ;
private stat ic StageGame 2x2 stageGamePlayed ;
public stat ic void main ( St r ing [ ] a rgs ) {
// Log to f i l e or s imp l y show r e s u l t s on sc r een ?
PrintStream log ;
i f ( LogF i l ePre f i x != ”” )
{
try {
l og = new PrintStream ( LogF i l ePre f i x + NGAMES + ” times ” + ITERATIONS + ” . log ” ) ;
}
catch ( IOException e ) {
l og = System . out ;
l og . p r i n t l n ( ”Could not open f i l e ” ) ;
}
}
else
l og = System . out ;
l og . p r i n t l n ( ”Averaging s imu lat i on o f ” + NGAMES + ” games over ” + ITERATIONS + ” i t e r a t i o n s . ” ) ;
l og . p r i n t l n ( ” i t e r a t i o n agent1 agent2 ” ) ;
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ” S ta r t i ng s imu la t ion o f ” + NGAMES + ” games over ” + ITERATIONS + ” i t e r a t i o n s . ” ) ;
double [ ] a1Scores = new double [ ITERATIONS + 1 ] ;
double [ ] a2Scores = new double [ ITERATIONS + 1 ] ;
// S imu la t e a number o f games
for ( int game = 1 ; game <= NGAMES; game++)
{
// With new agen t s and new game each t ime
agent1 = new ProbAgent (0 , 0 .64d , 0 .18d , 0 .28d , 0 .0d , 0 .5 d ) ;
agent2 = new ReinforcementLearnerAgent (0 , 1d , PAYOFFS PD A1 ) ; // Payo f f s f o r A1 s i n c e outcomes a lways seen from h i s p e r s p e c t i v e !
stageGamePlayed = new StageGame 2x2 (PAYOFFS PD A1, PAYOFFS PD A2) ;
// S imu la t e a l l i t e r a t i o n s and s t o r e average s c o r e s .
for ( int i t = 1 ; i t <= ITERATIONS; i t++) {
int outcome = stageGamePlayed . simGame( agent1 , agent2 ) ;
a1Scores [ i t ] = ( a1Scores [ i t ] ∗ (game − 1) + agent1 . g e tF i tn e s s ( ) / i t ) / game ;
a2Scores [ i t ] = ( a2Scores [ i t ] ∗ (game − 1) + agent2 . g e tF i tn e s s ( ) / i t ) / game ;
// i f ( i t % 10000 == 0) l o g . p r i n t l n (” Learner−pUP: ” + ( ( ReinforcementLearnerAgent ) agent2 ) . getpUP ( ) ) ;
// l o g . p r i n t l n (”Game r e s u l t : ” + OUTCOMENAMES[ outcome−1] + ” . Average s c o r e s a f t e r ” + i t + ” i t e r a t i o n s : agen t 1 : ” + agent1 . g e t F i t n e s s ( ) / i t + ” −− agen t 2 : ” + agent2 . g e t F i t n e s s ( ) / i t ) ;
}
}
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ” S ta r t i ng output . ” ) ;
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for ( int i t = 1 ; i t <= ITERATIONS; i t++)
{
l og . p r i n t l n ( i t + ” ” + a1Scores [ i t ] + ” ” + a2Scores [ i t ] ) ;
}
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ”done . ” ) ;
}
}
Listing B.3: StageGame 2x2.java
package de . LarsRoemheld . ItGame ;
/∗∗
∗ Prov ide s a s i n g l e one−s ho t 2 x2 game to enab l e s imu l a t i o n o f i t e r a t e d games .
∗ @author Lars Roemheld
∗/
public c lass StageGame 2x2 {
private double gamePAYOFFS a1 [ ] ;
private double gamePAYOFFS a2 [ ] ;
private Moves move1 ;
private Moves move2 ;
private int gameOutcome ;
public enum Moves {
UP, DOWN
}
/∗∗
∗ Cons t ruc to r .
∗ @param pa y o f f s a 1 agent1 ’ s p a y o f f s in t h i s game . An array c on t a i n i n g t h e game p a y o f f s as [ agent1 / agent2 : up/up , up/down , down/up , down/down ]
∗ @param pa y o f f s a 2 agent2 ’ s p a y o f f s in t h i s game . An array c on t a i n i n g t h e game p a y o f f s as [ agent1 / agent2 : up/up , up/down , down/up , down/down ]
∗/
public StageGame 2x2 (double payo f f s a1 [ ] , double payo f f s a2 [ ] ) {
this . gamePAYOFFS a1 = (double [ ] ) payo f f s a1 . c l one ( ) ;
this . gamePAYOFFS a2 = (double [ ] ) payo f f s a2 . c l one ( ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ S imu l a t e s a s i n g l e game between two agen t s .
∗ @return Returns t h e game outcome as i n t e g e r 1 . . 4 , as i n d i c e s o f [ up/up , up/down , down/up , down/down ]
∗/
public int simGame( Agent 2x2 a1 , Agent 2x2 a2 ) {
move1 = a1 .move ( ) ; // Make the ag en t s move
move2 = a2 .move ( ) ;
gameOutcome = 0 ; // I n t e r p r e t t h e r e s u l t s
i f (move1 == Moves .UP && move2 == Moves .UP)
{ gameOutcome = 1;} // uu
else i f (move1 == Moves .UP && move2 == Moves .DOWN)
{ gameOutcome = 2;} // ud
else i f (move1 == Moves .DOWN && move2 == Moves .UP)
{ gameOutcome = 3;} // du
else i f (move1 == Moves .DOWN && move2 == Moves .DOWN)
{ gameOutcome = 4;} // dd
// Pay out p a y o f f s
a1 . addFitness (gamePAYOFFS a1 [ gameOutcome − 1 ] ) ;
a2 . addFitness (gamePAYOFFS a2 [ gameOutcome − 1 ] ) ;
// No t i f y a g en t s o f t h e game outcome
a1 . outcome (move1 , move2 ) ;
a2 . outcome (move2 , move1 ) ;
return gameOutcome ;
}
}
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Listing B.4: Agent 2x2.java
package de . LarsRoemheld . ItGame ;
/∗
∗ This p r o v i d e s an a b s t r a c t c l a s s f o r a g en t s in i t e r a t e d 2 x2 games :
∗ Any agen t in 2 x2 s t a g e games shou l d implement t h i s c l a s s .
∗/
public abstract class Agent 2x2 {
// The p r i v a t e s co r e boa rd
private double f i t n e s s ;
// Se t up a new agen t and endow him wi th i n i t i a l f i t n e s s .
protected Agent 2x2 (double f i t n e s s ) {
this . f i t n e s s = f i t n e s s ;
}
public double ge tF i tn e s s ( ) {
return this . f i t n e s s ;
}
public void s e tF i t n e s s (double f i t n e s s ) {
this . f i t n e s s = f i t n e s s ;
}
public void addFitness (double dFitnes s ) {
this . f i t n e s s = this . f i t n e s s + dFitnes s ;
}
public abstract StageGame 2x2 . Moves move ( ) ;
public abstract void outcome ( StageGame 2x2 . Moves myMove , StageGame 2x2 . Moves opponentMove ) ;
}
Listing B.5: ProbAgent.java
package de . LarsRoemheld . ItGame ;
/∗
∗ This c l a s s implements a memory−1 p r o b a b i l i s t i c s t r a t e g y f o r
∗ i t e r a t e d 2 x2 games .
∗/
public c lass ProbAgent extends Agent 2x2{
// This agen t ’ s s t r a t e g y i s g i v en by f ou r c o n d i t i o n a l . . .
protected double p1 ;
protected double p2 ;
protected double p3 ;
protected double p4 ;
// and one un c ond i t i o n a l p r o b a b i l i t y ( s ee c on s t r u c t o r )
protected double pNoMem;
/∗ This agen t ’ s memory : t h e l a s t game ’ s outcome as seen
∗ by him ( i . e . assuming he i s agent1 ) ∗/
private int memory one ;
/∗∗
∗ Set up a new p r o b a b i l i s t i c agen t
∗ @param f i t n e s s s t a r t i n g f i t n e s s
∗ @param p1 prob ( up | ( up/up ) p l a y ed b e f o r e )
∗ @param p2 prob ( up | ( up/down ) p l a y ed b e f o r e )
∗ @param p3 prob ( up | ( down/up ) p l a y ed b e f o r e )
∗ @param p4 prob ( up | ( down/down ) p l a y ed b e f o r e )
∗ @param pNoMem prob ( up | no memory o f l a s t move , e . g . in f i r s t move )
∗/
public ProbAgent (double f i t n e s s , double p1 , double p2 , double p3 , double p4 , double pNoMem) {
super ( f i t n e s s ) ;
this . p1 = p1 ;
this . p2 = p2 ;
this . p3 = p3 ;
this . p4 = p4 ;
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this .pNoMem = pNoMem;
this . memory one = −1;
}
public StageGame 2x2 . Moves move ( ) {
// Determine t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f p l a y i n g UP
double probU ;
switch ( this . memory one ) {
case 1 : probU = this . p1 ; break ;
case 2 : probU = this . p2 ; break ;
case 3 : probU = this . p3 ; break ;
case 4 : probU = this . p4 ; break ;
default : probU = pNoMem; break ;
}
// Ro l l t h e d i c e ( a random number between 0 and 1)
double f a t e = Math . random ( ) ;
return ( f a t e < probU) ? StageGame 2x2 . Moves .UP : StageGame 2x2 . Moves .DOWN;
}
/∗∗
∗ Rece ive t h e l a s t game outcome ( to memorize )
∗ @param myMove l a s t move by t h i s agen t
∗ @param opponentMove l a s t move by t h i s agen t ’ s l a s t opponent
∗/
public void outcome ( StageGame 2x2 . Moves myMove , StageGame 2x2 . Moves opponentMove ) {
this . memory one = −1;
i f (myMove == StageGame 2x2 . Moves .UP && opponentMove == StageGame 2x2 . Moves .UP)
{ this . memory one = 1;} // uu
else i f (myMove == StageGame 2x2 . Moves .UP && opponentMove == StageGame 2x2 . Moves .DOWN)
{ this . memory one = 2;} // ud
else i f (myMove == StageGame 2x2 . Moves .DOWN && opponentMove == StageGame 2x2 . Moves .UP)
{ this . memory one = 3;} // du
else i f (myMove == StageGame 2x2 . Moves .DOWN && opponentMove == StageGame 2x2 . Moves .DOWN)
{ this . memory one = 4;} // dd
}
}
Listing B.6: ReinforcementLearnerAgent.java
package de . LarsRoemheld . ItGame ;
/∗∗
∗ Implements a 2x2−game agen t u t i l i z i n g a s imp l e l e a r n i n g
∗ a l g o r i t hm ( r e in f o r c emen t l e a r n i n g ) based on Chmura , Goerg , S e l t e n 2012
∗ ( p l a y i n g memory−0 t h e r e ) .
∗
∗ @author Lars Roemheld
∗/
public c lass ReinforcementLearnerAgent extends ProbAgent {
protected double pUP;
// A memory o f s o r t s : t o t a l s c o r e s ga ined when p l a y i n g UP or DOWN
protected double scoresUP ;
protected double scoresDOWN ;
protected StageGame 2x2 . Moves myLastMove = null ;
protected double myDiscountFactor ;
protected double [ ] game payof fs ;
public double getpUP ( ) {
return pUP;
}
/∗∗
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∗ Create a new l e a r n e r agen t w i th
∗ @param f i t n e s s S t a r t i n g f i t n e s s
∗ @param d i s c oun tFac t o r A d i s c oun t f a c t o r de t e rmin ing how much o f t h e
∗ f o l l o w i n g i t e r a t i o n ’ s p a y o f f s are a t t r i b u t e d to t h i s i t e r a t i o n ’ s a c t i on
∗ @param pa y o f f s The game ’ s p a y o f f s as seen from t h i s agen t ’ s p e r s p e c t i v e
∗/
public ReinforcementLearnerAgent (double f i t n e s s , double discountFactor , double [ ] payo f f s ) {
super ( f i t n e s s , 0 . 5 , 0 . 5 , 0 . 5 , 0 . 5 , 0 . 5 ) ;
this .pUP = 0.5d ;
this . scoresDOWN = 0d ; this . scoresUP = 0d ;
this . myDiscountFactor = discountFactor ;
this . game payof fs = payo f f s . c l one ( ) ;
}
// Record s u c c e s s o f d i f f e r e n t a c t i o n s
@Override
public void outcome ( StageGame 2x2 . Moves myMove , StageGame 2x2 . Moves opponentMove ) {
double payo f f = 0 ;
i f (myMove == StageGame 2x2 . Moves .UP) {
i f ( opponentMove == StageGame 2x2 . Moves .UP) payo f f = this . game payof fs [ 0 ] ; // uu
else payo f f = this . game payof fs [ 1 ] ; } // ud
else {
i f ( opponentMove == StageGame 2x2 . Moves .UP) payo f f = this . game payof fs [ 2 ] ; // du
else payo f f = this . game payof fs [ 3 ] ; } // dd
// Record s u c c e s s o f t h i s move
i f (myMove == StageGame 2x2 . Moves .UP) this . scoresUP += payo f f ;
i f (myMove == StageGame 2x2 . Moves .DOWN) this . scoresDOWN += payo f f ;
// And ta k e i n t o account t h i s r e s u l t f o r a t t r a c t i v e n e s s
// o f l a s t move , we i gh t ed by d i s c oun tFac t o r
i f (myLastMove == StageGame 2x2 . Moves .UP) this . scoresUP += this . myDiscountFactor ∗ payo f f ;
i f (myLastMove == StageGame 2x2 . Moves .DOWN) this . scoresDOWN += this . myDiscountFactor ∗ payo f f ;
// I f we have ga t h e r ed enough e x p e r i e n c e w i th bo th ac t i on s , s t a r t ” l e a r n i n g ”
i f ( this . scoresUP > 0 && this . scoresDOWN > 0)
this .pUP = this . scoresUP / ( this . scoresUP + this . scoresDOWN ) ;
this . p1 = this .pUP; this . p2 = this .pUP; this . p3 = this .pUP; this . p4 = this .pUP;
this .pNoMem = this .pUP;
myLastMove = myMove ;
}
}
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